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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Earl Trent challenges a district court's 
decision to abstain from hearing his case until a similar state 
court case is resolved.  We will affirm. 
 I. 
 Trent receives dialysis treatment at defendant 
Community Dialysis Center ("CDC") in Lansdowne, Pennsylvania.  
Defendant Dial Medical of Florida, Inc. ("Dial Medical") sells 
acid concentrate to CDC for use in dialysis treatment.  Between 
late 1988 and early 1992, several CDC patients, including Trent, 
were found to have high serum aluminum levels, which could result 
in aluminum poisoning. 
 In July, 1992, Trent filed a class action complaint in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania alleging negligence against CDC and Dial Medical.1  
Specifically, Trent alleged that the elevated aluminum levels in 
CDC patients resulted from CDC's use of aluminum pumps to pump 
acid concentrate through patients as part of their dialysis 
treatment.  In September, 1992, he filed a "motion for class 
                     
1
. CDC apparently filed a third-party complaint against W.W. 
Grainger, Inc. ("Grainger"), and American Machine and Tool 
Co., Inc. of Pennsylvania ("American Machine"), and Dial 
Medical filed a third-party complaint against Baxter 
Healthcare Corp. ("Baxter").  Dial Medical, Grainger, and 
American Machine have since been dismissed from this appeal 
pursuant to stipulations of dismissal filed with the 
district court, and Baxter was not a party to this appeal. 
  
maintenance," seeking certification of the class described in his 
amended complaint -- fifty-three CDC patients who have tested 
positive for serum aluminum levels of greater that 100 micrograms 
per liter (mcg/l) since January, 1990. 
 Shortly thereafter, Edwin Snead, who had earlier filed 
a similar class action complaint against CDC and its two medical 
directors in state court, moved to intervene in Trent's lawsuit.  
Snead, whose wife had died of aluminum poisoning after receiving 
dialysis treatment at CDC, sought in his case to represent a 
class comprised of all CDC patients injured by CDC's allegedly 
defective dialysis equipment and methods.  Snead's complaint 
alleged negligence and outrageous conduct and included counts for 
wrongful death and survival. 
 In November 1992, the district court granted Snead's 
motion to intervene, denied Trent's motion for class 
certification and sua sponte decided to abstain from hearing the 
Trent case in light of the pendency of the Snead case in state 
court.  The following order issued: 
  The motion of Edwin Snead . . . to 
intervene as a party plaintiff is GRANTED. 
 
  The motion of plaintiff Earl Trent for 
class certification is DENIED without 
prejudice. 
 
  This suit is DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE.  This case is to remain in status 
quo and the Statute of Limitations is tolled. 
 
  It is further understood that all 
discovery and settlement discussions will 
continue in coordination with the action 
currently pending in the Delaware County 
Court of Common Pleas styled Snead v. 
  
Community Dialysis Center, Inc. . . . .  If 
intervention by the court is needed or 
desired, the parties may ask for assistance 
by either filing the appropriate motions, 
writing to the court or setting a telephone 
conference. 
 
  The parties shall keep the court advised 
of the status of this case and the state 
court action.  When they are ready for trial 
or wish a settlement conference all that is 
necessary is to write directly to the court 
or set a telephone conference. 
App. at 185-86. 
 Since this appeal was argued, a class has been 
certified in the Snead case as to duty and breach of duty.  
Although the time period for opting out of that class has 
expired, Trent has chosen not to opt out.  Trent appeals the 
district court's decision to abstain from hearing his case. 
 II. 
 Initially we must determine whether federal appellate 
jurisdiction exists.  The district court had jurisdiction over 
this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).2  The inquiry into 
                     
2
. Stating that it "anticipates that discovery will reveal to a 
legal certainty that plaintiff will not be able to recover 
the jurisdictional amount of $50,000," CDC urges that the 
district court may not have had diversity jurisdiction over 
this case.  CDC's brief at 12 (footnote omitted).  Trent's 
complaint, however, alleges damages in excess of $50,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs.  Unless it appears to a 
legal certainty from the facts alleged that this case does 
not involve potential damages on that scale, the district 
court had jurisdiction.  Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289 (3d 
Cir. 1971); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  Given that Trent seeks 
both compensatory and punitive damages, and the lack of 
clarity as to the extent of his injuries, if he suffered 
any, we cannot say with any certainty -- legal or otherwise 
-- at this time that his damages will amount to less than 
$50,000. 
  
our jurisdiction, which we would undertake in any event but which 
is also the subject of a pending motion to dismiss for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction, is more complex due to conflicting 
statements in the district court's order. 
 That order indicates that Trent's case was dismissed 
without prejudice.  An order dismissing a case is, of course, 
final and appealable.  Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Callison, 844 
F.2d 133, 134-35 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1988).  Even dismissals without 
prejudice have been held to be final and appealable if they 
"end[] [the] suit so far as the District Court was concerned," 
United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1 
(1949), although we have indicated that such dismissals may not 
constitute final orders until the party seeking relief renounces 
any intention to reinstate litigation.  See Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 
F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 The court's order is not clearly a dismissal, however, 
for it states that the case is "to remain in status quo," 
"discovery and settlement discussions will continue in 
coordination with" the Snead case, the parties may contact the 
court if they desire judicial intervention, and the parties need 
only "write directly to the court or set a telephone conference" 
when they "are ready for trial or wish a settlement conference."  
App. at 185-86.  The order thus appears to remove the case from 
the district court's docket of pending cases but to anticipate 
reactivation.  See Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1977).  
Therefore, the proper jurisdictional inquiry focusses on an 
interpretation of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
  
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), and other cases addressing the issue of 
whether a stay order is final for purposes of appeal.  See Rolo 
v. General Development Corp., 949 F.2d 695, 700-02 (3d Cir. 
1991); Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 104-05 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Underwriters, Inc., 846 F.2d 196, 198 
(3d Cir. 1988); Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 
F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court held that a stay 
grounded in the pendency of similar litigation in state court is 
appealable if it "effectively deprive[s] the plaintiff of its 
right to a federal forum because once the state court 
adjudicate[s] the issues in the case, a federal court would be 
bound to honor those determinations as res judicata."  Schall, 
885 F.2d at 104.  Under Moses H. Cone, even if a stay order is 
entered with the expectation that the federal litigation will 
resume if the plaintiff does not obtain relief in state court, 
the stay decision may be appealed if "the object of the stay is 
to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be 
litigated in a state forum."  Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11. 
 That is precisely the effect the district court's order 
will have here.  It is clear that the district court judge 
expected that Snead would resolve this case, at least in large 
part.  A decision in Snead will constitute res judicata as to at 
least the two major issues (duty and breach) in Trent.3  
                     
3
. CDC has asserted a counterclaim against Trent in his lawsuit 
alleging that he has failed to pay for his dialysis 
treatments.  Snead may not resolve this counterclaim, 
although, depending on the substance of Trent's defense to 
  
Effectively requiring Trent either to wait until Snead is 
resolved or to remain in the Snead class deprives him of the 
opportunity to pursue remedies in federal court, thus 
constituting a requirement that "all or an essential part of the 
federal suit . . . be litigated in a state forum."  Moses H. 
Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11.  Since issuing the order in question, 
in fact, the district court has denied as moot a motion to file a 
second amended complaint, thus implying that it believes it has 
effectively disposed of the case. 
 In Moses H. Cone, "[t]he Court distinguished between 
stay orders that `merely . . . have the practical effect of 
allowing a state court to be the first to rule on a common issue' 
(such as an `ordinary delay in the interest of docket control') 
and stay orders whose `sole purpose and effect . . . are 
precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state 
court.'  . . .  Only the latter type of stay order is immediately 
appealable."  Schall, 885 F.2d at 104, quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 
U.S. at 10 n.11.  CDC attempts to categorize this case as one in 
which the district court has issued a stay merely to afford the 
state court an opportunity to rule first on a common issue.  It 
sees this order as an attempt at docket control rather than an 
action which effectively dismisses Trent's case.  Thus, it argues 
that we lack jurisdiction. 
                                                                  
it, it is conceivable that even that counterclaim may be 
resolved by a verdict in Snead. 
  
 Indeed, portions of the order point in the direction 
CDC indicates.  The order provides that "the case is to remain in 
the status quo" and that "all discovery and settlement discussion 
will continue in coordination with the action currently pending 
in . . . Snead."  App. at 185.  It also instructs the parties 
that the judge will be amenable to intervening if the parties ask 
him to do so, and that they should keep him "advised of the 
status of this case and the state court action."  Id.  In the 
same vein, it provides that "[w]hen [the parties] are ready for 
trial or wish a settlement conference all that is necessary is to 
write directly to the court or set a telephone conference."  App. 
at 185-86.  Moreover, since entering the order, the district 
court judge has denied a motion to stay discovery pending this 
appeal, thus perhaps implying that he expects discovery to 
continue because the case is still pending.4 
 The order's unintended lack of clarity, which has been 
exacerbated by the denial of the discovery motion, does not, 
however, compel a conclusion that we lack appellate jurisdiction.  
Two relevant precedents assist in line-drawing here, and 
comparison with those cases provides the focus for our decision 
that we have appellate jurisdiction. 
 In Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, supra, 
we examined a district court's decision to abstain from a class 
                     
4
. Of course, this could alternatively imply that the judge 
believes he has no jurisdiction to consider the motion to 
stay discovery because the case has been dismissed. 
 
  
action suit alleging segregation in the Pennsylvania higher 
education system until the United States Department of Education 
had adjudicated administrative procedures regarding the 
allegation.  We acknowledged Moses H. Cone's holding that, 
although a stay is not ordinarily a final decision, an appellate 
court may review it when it "amounts to a dismissal of the 
underlying suit."  Cheyney, 703 F.2d at 735.  We also 
acknowledged that "[a]n indefinite stay order that unreasonably 
delays a plaintiff's right to have his case heard is appealable."  
Id.  We held, however, that "[t]he stay in this case does not 
have the practical effect of a dismissal.  Nothing in the 
district court's opinion or order intimates that the stay was 
intended to `deep six' the suit.  Plaintiffs have not been put 
`effectively out of court.'  . . .  Nor is the case `rife with 
special circumstances which bring it outside the general rule and 
so limit its precedential value as to not measurably weaken our 
continued aversion to piecemeal appeals.'"  Id.  Rather, based in 
large part on the district court's instruction that the parties 
report to it on the progress of the administrative proceedings, 
we were "convinced" that "this stay [was] merely a temporary 
suspension of proceedings."  Id. at 735.  Therefore, we 
determined that we lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from the 
stay order because the district court was only abstaining until 
the plaintiffs proceeded on the administrative level.  There was 
no indication that the outcome of the administrative proceeding 
would deprive plaintiffs of their day in federal court. 
  
 Conversely, in Schall, we held that a district court's 
decision to stay a case pending the disposition of a state court 
case was appealable because:  (1) there was no indication that 
the order was tentative (i.e., there was no basis to suppose that 
the district judge contemplated any reconsideration of his 
decision to defer to the parallel state-court suit (quoting Moses 
H. Cone)); (2) the district court had instructed the plaintiff to 
proceed in state court and then ordered the stay pending the 
outcome of those state court proceedings, leading us to believe 
that "the district court stayed the suit to relegate the 
plaintiff to state court rather than to exercise control over its 
docket"; and (3) the issues in the state court suit constituted 
the heart of the federal court suit, thus effectively preventing 
the litigation in federal court of a significant part of 
plaintiff's federal case.  Schall, 885 F.2d at 105. 
 Arguably, unlike Schall, the order on appeal here 
indicates that the district court might reconsider whether to 
defer to Snead.  The court's statements that it will "intervene" 
if asked and will set a trial date or a settlement conference 
upon request imply not only that it recognizes that there may be 
some issues remaining after Snead is disposed of, but also that 
it might try the case whenever the parties (apparently jointly) 
seek a trial date.  Like Schall, however, the issues in Snead 
provide the central focus of this case, so the district court's 
order effectively prevents litigation of Trent's claims in 
federal court and requires him to abide by the state court 
decision in Snead.  (Although Snead alleges more legal bases for 
  
relief that the Trent case does, the allegations of the Trent 
case are subsumed within Snead.)  Unlike Cheyney, then, this stay 
has the practical effect of a dismissal rather than merely 
delaying adjudication until completion of administrative or state 
court proceedings.  Therefore, we conclude that, like the orders 
in Schall and Moses H. Cone, this stay order is immediately 
appealable and we may exercise jurisdiction over it. 
 III. 
 The district court decided to defer exercising 
jurisdiction over this case under the "exceptional circumstances" 
doctrine of Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).  See Ingersoll-Rand, 844 F.2d 133.  
Colorado River abstention is not one of the three 
constitutionally- or comity-based traditional grounds for 
abstention.5  Instead, under Colorado River, even if a case (such 
as this one) does not fall within one of the three traditional 
categories, 
                     
5
. The three constitutionally- or comity-based grounds for 
abstention are Pullman abstention, an outgrowth of Railroad 
Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), which 
is proper when a state court determination of a question of 
state law might moot or change a federal constitutional 
issue presented in a federal court case; Burford abstention, 
an outgrowth of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), 
which is proper when questions of state law in which the 
state has expressed a desire to establish a coherent policy 
with respect to a matter of substantial public concern are 
presented; and Younger abstention, an outgrowth of Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which is proper when federal 
jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining 
certain state proceedings.  See generally Colorado River 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-16 
(1976). 
  
 there are principles unrelated to 
considerations of proper constitutional 
adjudication and regard for federal-state 
relations which govern in situations 
involving the contemporaneous exercise of 
concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal 
courts or by state and federal courts.  These 
principles rest on consideration of "[w]ise 
judicial administration, giving regard to 
conservation of judicial resources and 
comprehensive disposition of litigation." 
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. 
C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952).  While 
abstention even under the three traditional categories is the 
exception, rather than the rule, Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813 
(Moses H. Cone, 406 U.S. at 14), Colorado River abstention is 
even rarer, for two reasons.  First, generally, the pendency of a 
case in state court will not bar federal litigation of a case 
concerning the same issues if the federal court has jurisdiction 
over the case before it.  Id. at 817.  Second, the federal courts 
have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the 
jurisdiction given them."  Id. at 817; see also Olde Discount 
Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 A. 
 In reviewing an abstention decision, "the underlying 
legal questions are subject to plenary review, although the 
decision to abstain is reviewed for abuse of discretion."  
University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 
269 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19; 
General Glass Indus. Corp. v. Monsour Medical Found., 973 F.2d 
197, 200 (3d Cir. 1992). 
  
 In other words,  
 The determination of whether this case falls 
in the area within which the district court 
may exercise discretion is . . . a matter of 
law, reviewable on a plenary basis.  Only if 
we determine that the case falls within this 
range will we apply an abuse of discretion 
standard in reviewing the district court's 
decision to abstain. 
University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 270. 
 B. 
 Cases that are not truly duplicative do not invite 
Colorado River deference.  University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 
276; Complaint of Bankers Trust Co. v. Chatterjee, 636 F.2d 37, 
40-41 (3d Cir. 1980); see also LaDuke v. Burlington Northern R.R. 
Co., 879 F.2d 1556 (7th Cir. 1989).  Therefore, we initially 
inquire whether the Trent case and the Snead case are parallel. 
 Generally, cases are parallel so as to justify 
abstention under Colorado River when they involve the same 
parties and claims.  In LaDuke, a plaintiff sued his employer in 
state court and then filed an identical suit in federal court.  
The cases were "parallel" because they involved identical parties 
and claims.  La Duke, 879 F.2d at 1559.  Similarly, in Moses H. 
Cone and Colorado River, the state and federal cases involved the 
same claims and the same parties, although the defendants in the 
federal cases appeared as plaintiffs in the state cases.  Moses 
H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 7; Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 805-06.  
Thus, those cases, too, were parallel. 
 In contrast, when a federal court case involves claims 
that are distinct from those at issue in a state court case, the 
  
cases are not parallel and do not justify Colorado River 
abstention.  In University of Maryland, for example, we reversed 
a district court's dismissal of a class action fraud case filed 
by policyholders of an insolvent insurance company against the 
insurance company's independent auditor.  The district court 
decided to abstain under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 
(1943) (see note 5, supra), in favor of a state court case 
against the same auditor brought by the Pennsylvania insurance 
commissioner on behalf of the insurance company and its 
policyholders.  Although the district court had based its 
decision upon Burford, we reviewed its decision under both 
Burford and Colorado River. 
 We reversed the district court because the parties and 
claims in each of the two cases differed.  The insolvent 
insurance company was a party to the state court suit but not to 
the one brought in federal court.  The classes of policyholders 
involved in each case differed.  And the insurance commissioner's 
lawsuit alleged fewer legal bases for relief than did the federal 
court suit.  University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 268-69.  
Therefore, the policyholders' claims in the federal court case 
were "distinct" from those asserted in the commissioner's case; 
because of this "lack of identity of all issues," and because 
there was "no theoretical obstacle to both actions proceeding 
independently," we ruled that abstention under Colorado River 
would be improper.  Id. at 276. 
 Similarly, in Complaint of Bankers Trust, we admonished 
that "[i]t is important . . . that only truly duplicative 
  
proceedings be avoided.  When the claims, parties, or requested 
relief differ, deference may not be appropriate."  Complaint of 
Bankers Trust, 636 F.2d at 40.  In that case, we reviewed a 
federal district court's decision to defer in favor of litigation 
pending in another federal district court.  Because neither the 
parties to nor the relief requested in the two cases at issue 
were identical, and because the two cases employed substantially 
different "approaches" and might "achieve potentially different 
results," we reversed the district court's "docket-control 
dismissal" of one of the cases.  Id. at 41. 
 In this case, the district court ruled that Trent and 
Snead were parallel because it found them to be "substantially 
identical."  App. at 180.  The two cases do in fact raise nearly 
identical allegations and issues, and the defendants in each are 
essentially identical.6  Moreover, as the district court found, 
the plaintiffs in the two cases are effectively the same.7  That 
                     
6
. The Snead case in state court includes as defendants the two 
medical directors of CDC in addition to CDC itself.  This 
does not trouble us, since abstention will in no way deny 
Trent an opportunity to have his claims litigated against 
the remaining defendant in this federal suit -- CDC.  See 
supra n.1. 
7
. The court stated: 
 
  The class previously certified by the state 
court includes all CDC patients who utilized 
the defective dialysis equipment at CDC and 
suffered injury as a result.  Although the 
putative class defined by plaintiff Trent is 
somewhat more limited, he relies upon the 
same allegations of negligence. 
 
 App. at 180 (emphasis added). 
 
  
Snead has been certified only as to duty and breach of that duty 
does not negate the fact that the determination of those issues 
in Snead will resolve them in Trent.  Trent's decision not to opt 
out of Snead8 means that Snead will result in recovery for him if 
the class prevails on the class-wide issues and he is found to 
have suffered damages as a result of the defendants' actions.  In 
sum, Trent and Snead are parallel and thus present an appropriate 
setting for Colorado River abstention. 
 C. 
 Given that this case is one in which Colorado River 
abstention may be appropriate, we now must determine whether the 
decision to abstain constituted an abuse of the district court's 
discretion.  We conclude that it did not. 
                                                                  
 In fact, the class in Snead had not yet been certified at 
the time the district court decided to abstain.  App. at 
177.  Subsequent events have nonetheless proven the district 
court judge to have been prescient, for, as previously 
noted, the judge handling Snead has, during the pendency of 
this appeal, certified a class consisting of "all persons 
who received bicarbonate dialysate treatments at CDC's 
Lansdowne facility between January 1, 1990 and February 7, 
1992, the spouses of all such patients and the 
administrators and the executors of the estates of such 
persons and/or their spouses."  Attachment to Letter from P. 
Quinn to P. Lester (Deputy Clerk, Third Circuit) of June 30, 
1994 (state court order in Snead granting class 
certification).  Clearly, Trent would be a member of that 
class. 
8
. Trent states that he intends to move for permission to opt 
out of the Snead class after receiving our decision in this 
appeal.  At oral argument, he expressed an intention to 
pursue his case on an individual basis instead of as a class 
action.  We cannot assume that his belated motion to opt out 
of the Snead class will be granted, however, so we must 
consider him to be a member of the Snead class as we decide 
this appeal. 
  
 The factors which govern a district court's exercise of 
discretion in deciding whether to abstain under Colorado River 
are: 
 (1) Which court first assumed jurisdiction 
over property involved, if any; 
 
 (2) Whether the federal forum is 
inconvenient; 
 
 (3) The desirability of avoiding piecemeal 
litigation; 
 
 (4) The order in which the respective courts 
obtained jurisdiction; 
 
 (5) Whether federal or state law applies; 
and 
 
 (6) Whether the state court proceeding would 
adequately protect the federal 
plaintiff's rights. 
See generally Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15-16, 19-26; see also 
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-19 ("No one factor is necessarily 
determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into 
account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the 
combination of factors counselling against that exercise is 
required. . . .  Only the clearest of justifications will warrant 
dismissal."). 
 Many factors weigh in favor of abstention in this case.  
The principal reasons to abstain, once abstention has been found 
to be possible, are to avoid piecemeal litigation and to 
adjudicate state-law issues in state court.  Cf. DeCisneros v. 
Younger, 871 F.2d 305, 309 (2d Cir. 1989).  Here, state rather 
than federal law is at issue, and piecemeal litigation might 
  
result if the district court presided over Trent while Snead was 
progressing through the state court system.  Moreover, the class 
certified in Snead is broader than that asserted in Trent.  Snead 
thus will resolve more individuals' claims than Trent would; it 
makes more sense to resolve common issues in a setting which will 
dispose of the most claims.  Finally, Snead was filed before 
Trent and, more importantly under Moses H. Cone, it appears as if 
Snead has invested more time into substantive work and discovery 
in his case.  See App. at 32. 
 In sum, because the parties agree that there is no res 
over which any court has exercised jurisdiction, only one factor 
truly weighs in favor of the district court exercising federal 
jurisdiction.  That is simply that the federal forum is not 
inconvenient.  This alone, even given the obligation federal 
courts have to exercise their jurisdiction, cannot justify a 
decision to exercise jurisdiction when the countervailing factors 




 Trent and CDC also argue that the district court erred 
in granting Snead's motion to intervene because Snead had not 
complied with the requirements of Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in filing it.9  We need not reach the merits 
of this argument on appeal because orders granting intervention 
are not final for purposes of appeal.  In re Continental 
Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 286 (3d Cir. 1991); Matter of Marin 
Motor Oil, Inc., 689 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1982); Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 
506 F.2d 735, 742 (3d Cir. 1974).  Trent's and CDC's arguments 
must await the conclusion of this case before they may be 
considered. 
 V. 
 In conclusion, we will affirm the district court's 
decision to abstain from proceeding further with Trent until the 
parties inform it either that Snead has reached some conclusion 
but issues remain for disposition in Trent or that it is 





                     
9
. Rule 24(c) requires that a person seeking to intervene in a 
lawsuit serve upon the parties to the lawsuit a motion to 
intervene which sets forth the grounds for intervention and 
is accompanied "by a pleading setting forth the claim or 
defense for which intervention is sought."  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 24(c). 
